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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2-2(3 )(j), Utah Code Ann.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants/Appellees upon a finding that, as a matter of law. Guardian, based
upon the undisputed material facts, could not proceed on an action framed in
contract.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor
of Defendant/Appellees upon a finding that, as a matter of law. Guardian's
alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was based
upon a breach of a tort duty.
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor
of Defendant/Appellees upon a finding that, as a matter of law, an employer is not
liable for the illegal acts of an employee which were undertaken for no one's
benefit but her own.
II. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Appellee accepts as accurate the Appellant's statement of the appropriate
standard of review.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES. AND REGULATIONS
The Appellee submits that there are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations at issue before the Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the purposes of this appeal, the appellee, Tebbs, is not dissatisfied with
the Appellant's statement of the case, and will continue to reference the parties
in the same manner as the Appellant. However, the Appellee submits the
following additional points.
I.

NATURE O F CASE, COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Guardian and Rex have now entered into a stipulation for a dismissal with
prejudice of Guardian's complaint against Rex, which has resulted in an order of
dismissal. Tebbs is the sole remaining defendant (and appellee) in this case.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Guardian is a Utah corporation in the title insurance business. (R. at
182.)
2. In the mid-1970's, Guardian retained Tebbs to provide accounting

This Order of Dismissal was entered by the trial court on August 1st, 2001.

services. Initially, these services included reconciling bank accounts, handling
taxes, including income tax returns, and preparing financial statements.
Sometime later, these services were expanded to include payroll services. (Id.)
3. Guardian kept a separate bank account only for payroll, including
payroll taxes. (R. at 183.)
4. In 1996, Mr. Curlis, Guardian's President, moved to St. George, but
continued to run Guardian's Salt Lake City office from St. George. (Id.)
5. The pre-signed check procedure came about as a convenience to Curlis
because he had moved to St. George. (R. at 184.)
6. Guardian gave Tebbs a copy of its employee payroll sheet so Tebbs
knew how many employees Guardian had and how many checks would be given
to Curlis to pre-sign. Curlis did not count the printed payroll checks before
distributing them to Guardian employees. (Id.)
7. Curlis instructed [an employee] Yolanda Carroll, to pre-stamp those
checks that were sent over from Tebbs in blank and then send them back to
Tebbs. Curlis did not require Yoland Carroll to count the number of checks and
compare them with the number of employees who were supposed to get a check.
(R. at 185.)
8. Guardian did not use Curlis' signature stamp other than for payroll
purposes. (Id.)
-3-

9. Rex was not totally in favor of pre-signed checks or in using a signature
stamp. Rex indicated to Curlis that it was not a good idea. But this was a
procedure that Curlis wanted. (R. at 186.)
10. Curlis did not discuss with Rex any kind of controls that would be put
in place to make sure that a check was not signed to be used for something other
than payroll. (Id.)
11. Bank account statements for Guardian's payroll were sent directly to
the accounting firm. Guardian did not charge anyone from its company to look
at bank account statements and no one at Guardian was charsed with reviewing
the accounting services. (R. at 188.)
12. Curlis never asked to have a reconciliation sent to him and never asked
for a cash disbursement or bank draft journal. {Id.)
13. Guardian's payroll procedure did not change when Guardian shifted
its accounting services from Tebbs to Rex, and later from Rex to Stagg. (R. at
190, 191).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Guardian's claim and case against the last remaining defendant in this case,
Tebbs, is for breach of contract; more specifically, for breach of an implied
covenant based upon an agreement to provide accounting services. Guardian
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makes no claim that Tebbs breached the express terms to provide accounting
services, and there is no claim that Tebbs did not provide the accounting services
contracted for. The only claim is that Mitchell "s criminal acts are a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Guardian attempts to blur the long established distinctions that have long
defined the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it relates to contract actions
and ton claims. The trial court clearly saw the distinction between the claims that
Guardian was actually making as to the manner in which the claims were pleaded
and. accordingly, granted Appellees' motion a summary judgment.
The reasons for Guardian's are quite clear. The law does not make an
employer liable for the criminal acts of an employee, which illegal acts were such
as to further her own interests and in no way advanced the interests of the
employer. Guardian also seeks to eliminate the risk that its own negligence will
reduce, if not eliminate, the damages it seeks.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT A CONTRACT ACTION
BROUGHT AGAINST A PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRM IS TREATED
IN ALL RESPECTS AS A TORT ACTION

The trial court did not conclude, nor did the Defendants argue, that
Guardian could only assert a negligence cause of action in claims made against
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professional accounting firms. What the Defendants did argue, and what the trial
court did conclude, is that based upon the undisputed material facts in this case
that despite how Guardian had framed its pleadings Guardian's claims against the
accountant Defendants were tort and not contract claims; and, that there was no
contractual provisions between the parties upon which Guardian could prevail.
Guardian hired Tebbs, initially, to reconcile bank accounts, handle taxes,
including income tax returns, and to prepare financial statements. Later, the
services that Tebbs agreed to perform for Guardian included payroll preparation
and other payroll services. The agreement was, apparently, never reduced to
writing, nor does Guardian contend that the express agreement between itself and
Tebbs includes anything else. It did not include, for an example, a provision that
a Tebbs* employee would not write checks to herself or that Tebbs would
indemnify Guardian for the criminal acts of an employee."
Guardian has pleaded this case as a contract action. The trial court
therefore analyzed this case purely as a contract claim and nothing more.
Thereafter, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Tebbs did not breach
any agreement with Guardian and that Guardian could not establish the requisite
causation.

Arguably, Guardian could have contracted for such provisions, but did not.
-6-

Guardian's Complaint alleges two express agreements relevant to this
motion. First Guardian alleges that it hired Tebbs to perform accounting
services.

Second. Guardian alleges that, "Tebbs expressly and implicitly

covenanted and agreed that it would charge and commission the performance of
said services and duties by such of its employees as would perform the same
accurately, properly, competently and with honesty and fidelity." It is undisputed
in this case, however, that the contract Guardian made with Tebbs was,
"[Reconciliation of bank accounts such as general office, trust account, handling
our income tax returns, preparation of financial statements." (R. at 210, pp. 1112.) This "express" agreement was never in writing and was, even then, only of
a general nature as to the type of accounting services that would be, and were
thereafter, provided.
The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Tebbs did not breach
this agreement with Guardian. There is no allegation that Tebbs failed to provide
reconciliation of bank accounts, the handling of Guardian's income tax returns,
the preparation of financial statements, or did not provide payroll services. To
the extent prior oral conversations are even material, Curlis' testimony establishes
that such oral conversations did not include an express representation of the
"covenant" of fidelity alleged in the Complaint. Accordingly, Guardian's claim
based on a breach of express agreement was dismissed as a matter of law.
-7-

Guardian concedes that its claim is for breach of an implied covenant. The
parties even agree on the law governing how to analyze a claim. Utah courts
follow the rule that if a cause of action arises from a breach of a promise set forth
in a contract, the action is ex contractu (from a contract), but if it arises from a
breach of duty growing out of the contract it is ex delicto [from a tort]. See DCR
Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983); Peterson v. Browning.
832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992). They disagree, however, on its application in
this case.
The "implied" duty Guardian seeks to enforce in this case is the
professional standard of care inherent in and "growing out of" the contract for
accounting services. In other words, Tebbs had a duty imposed by law, arising
out of any contract it had with Guardian, to conform to the standards of care of
an accounting professional, the breach of which gives rise to a cause of action.
The trial court recognized Guardian's claim for what it is and analyzed it
accordingly. Thereafter, the trial court granted the Defendants' motion for a
summary judgment.
The case law supports the trial court's ruling. In Peterson v. Browning,
relied upon by Guardian, this Court held that an action based on the public policy
exception to at-will employment "sounds in tort," despite the fact that it arises
from the termination of an employment contract. Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284.
-8-

Peterson explained that "[characterizing a case as a tort or contract. . . focuses
on the duty which has allegedly been breached, asking whether the duty arises
from a promise set forth in the contract or is one imposed by law. independent of
contract."

Id.

The court concluded that the "obligation to refrain from

discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend
upon any express or implied promise arising from the employment contract.
Instead, the tort cause of action arises out of the contractual relationship." Id.
(quoting DCR. Inc., 663 P.2d at 437).
Likewise, the professional duty to deal honestly with funds entrusted by a
client is a duty imposed by law, independent of any agreement between the
parties.

Such an obligation is implied in even' professional relationship,

regardless of the terms formed by the parties' meeting of the minds. Guardian's
own citations confirm as much. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909
P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("In all relationships with clients,
attorneys are required to exercise impeccable honesty, fair dealing, and fidelity.");
1 Am. Jur. 2d Accountants sec. 19 ("[I]t is implied in all contracts for the
employment of public accountants that they will render their services with that
degree of skill, care, knowledge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised
by members of that profession in the particular locality
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").

Guardian's case citations also reveal that the heart of the Court's analysis
in this case is the same regardless how the claim is pleaded. In Kilparhck. which
Guardian argues is "directly on point." the plaintiffs advanced a claim of breach
of fiduciary duty against the law firm based on the alleged conflict of interest.
The Court observed (in dicta) that while the law "has grown chiefly around
actions based on negligence," clients may frame their claims for wrongdoing in
either contract, tort, or fiduciary duty. Id. at 1289, 1290; see also Dunn v.
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 902-03 (Utah 1978)
(Maughn, J., dissenting) (opinion same in dissenting opinion). The Kilpatrick
court concluded, however, that regardless how the claim is pleaded, the causation
analysis that is at issue in the instant case is always the same.
A vital rule of legal malpractice actions is that the alleged
wrong of the attorney must proximately cause the client's injury.
Although breach of fiduciary duty actions concern different wrongs
from the negligence actions, the same standard of causation applies
whether the alleged wrong is a negligent act, a fiduciary breach, or
even a contractual breach.
Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291 (emphasis added). To prevail on a claim, a plaintiff
must establish not only actual cause (i.e., but-for the wrong, the injury would not
have occurred), but also proximate cause (i.e., the "thread of causation" between
fault and damages is "unbroken"). Id. at 1291, 1293.
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Guardian argues on appeal that the trial court misunderstood Kilparrick.
apparently because the trial court looked beyond the way the case was pleaded to
the actual nature of the claims. Just because a malpractice claim max be pleaded
based upon breach of contract breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence does not
mean that the trial court is bound to analyze the case as pleaded when the facts
show that the claims are of a different nature. The trial court applied the correct
analysis.
In determining whether Tebbs" alleged wrongdoing proximately caused
Guardian's damages, the Court should take into consideration Guardian's own
role in causing the loss. See Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 996 P.2d 531,
534 (Utah 2000) (holding in suit against accounting firm that plaintiffs fault can
be considered in determining causation and damages, and damages may be
reduced proportionately if plaintiff s fault is causally connected to the injury).
Guardian tries to distinguish the law in Steiner on the grounds that the action there
involved a negligence claim. As Kilpatrick makes clear, however, the tort-based
causation analysis this Court should use is identical whether the claim is framed
as a tort, contract, or fiduciary duty action.
Here, Guardian cannot establish that the "thread of causation" is
"unbroken" between its injury and Tebbs' alleged wrongdoing in assigning
Mitchell to the Guardian account. It is undisputed in the record that Guardian
- 11 -

provided Mitchell one more blank, signed check than it had employees during
each pay period in question, and received back one fewer that it proxided: that
Guardian itself distributed the payroll checks; and that Guardian itself consistently
transferred more money to its payroll account than it distributed to its employees.
Despite its unsupported factual argument to the contrary. Guardian had in its
possession all information necessary to verify its own payroll, but simply failed,
unreasonably, to do so. The law does not allow a party under such circumstances
to shift to someone else the loss attributable to its fault. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-38(3).
Guardian further alleges that Tebbs "implicitly covenanted and agreed that
it would charge and commission the performance of said [accounting] services
and duties by such of its employees as would perform the same accurately,
properly, competently and with honesty and fidelity." Guardian can produce no
evidence showing that Tebbs in fact implicitly agreed to this term - except to the
extent such a duty is independently imposed by law.
The record facts in this case unequivocally establish as much. Such a
covenant was not implied in any written contract between these parties, as there
was none. Such a covenant was not implied in any oral communications between
these parties at the time Guardian hired Tebbs, as there were none. As a matter
of law, the arrangement for accounting services did not contain the implicit terms
-12-

Guardian alleges, except to the extent implied by law. There is no record
evidence to support any other factual implications, even viewing all facts in the
light most favorable to Guardian.
Contractual liability is based on a duty created by the mutual assent of the
parties. The parties simply did not contract to shift all risk of loss to Tebbs. either
impliedly or otherwise, in the circumstances of this case. "It is fundamental that
a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the
formation of a contract." Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368,
373 (Utah 1996). "An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or
demonstrate that there was no intent to contract." Id. The terms of the alleged
implied contract in this case do not meet this reasonable certainty requirement,
at least to the extent Guardian suggests the Court should derive such implications
as a factual matter from the parties* communications and not from professional
duties imposed by law on Tebbs.
Contract damages are recoverable only for losses caused by the contract
breach. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 346-347. Moreover, damages are
not recoverable for loss the plaintiff could have avoided without undue risk,
burden, or humiliation. Id. § 350. As set forth in paragraphs of the undisputed
facts and argued more fully below, Guardian would have avoided the losses it
now claims had it employed the simplest common sense and basic business
-13-

judgment. It did not, however, and now seeks to lay the consequences of its
actions exclusively at the feet of Tebbs. The trial court reject that effort as a
matter of law given Guardian's indisputable unreasonableness under the
circumstances of this case and properly dismiss Guardian's contract claim against
Tebbs.
II.
IN THE INSTANT CASE AN ACTON FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING SOUNDS IN TORT

In an effort to stave off a dispositive legal ruling, Guardian suggests that
Tebbs breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Guardian did
not plead this claim in its Complaint, however.
Even if this unpleaded claim were at issue, the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing "cannot be construed . . . to establish new, independent rights or
duties not agreed upon by the parties." Breyhany \\ Nordstrom. Inc., 812 P.2d 49,
55 (Utah 1991). Here, Guardian would have this Court add a new contract term
that was not the express subject of the parties' agreement: that Stacey Mitchell
would not secretly write checks to herself on Guardian's account. Guardian's
attempt fails as a matter of law. The duty of a professional not to take money
from a client without authorization is a duty imposed by law. The good faith
covenant cannot be used to somehow turn this independent duty into a contractual
provision.

- 14-

The substantial majority of courts require a claim for a breach of an
accountant's professional standards to be brought as a negligence or professional
malpractice action. See e.g.. F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Young. 967 F.2d 166. 172 (5 n
Cir. 1992) (contract claim merely asserts that auditor violated its common law
duty of care, which is a tort claim); Clark v. Milam. 847 F. Supp. 409. 420-21
(S.D. W. Va. 1994) (applying West Virginia law): Askanase v. Fatjo. 838 F.
Supp. 465, 469 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (complaint stated claim in tort): Robertson v.
White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 972-74 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (noting that majority rule and
better rule was that claim sounded only in tort); Baehr v. Touche Ross & Co.. 62
B.R. 793, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting argument that contract statute of
limitations should apply to claim for professional malpractice because the claim
arose from a contractual relationship); Sato v. Van Denburgh. 599 P.2d 181, 183
(Ariz. 1979) (complaint sounds in tort). Guardian has not pleaded a tort claim,
however, nor has it produced evidence to establish the relevant professional
standard or a breach thereof by Tebbs. Consequently, Guardian cannot prevail,
as a matter of law.
Guardian cites a 1940 Kansas case to support its assertion that accountants
have an implied duty of, "skill, accuracy and fidelity." Board of County Comm rs
v. Baker, 102 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Kan. 1940). In a case decided 42 years later,
however, the Kansas Supreme Court held that such claims sound in tort and not
- 15-

in contract. Bnieckv. T.R. Krings, 638 P.2d 904, 907-08 (Kan. 1982). The court
held that the gravamen of the allegations regarding perfomiance of an audit was
a violation of "a duty imposed by law as a result of the contractual relationship
between the parties." Id at 907.
Tebbs does not dispute that by performing accounting services for
Guardian it was required to "render [its] services with that degree of skill, care,
knowledge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of that
profession in the particular locality." 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accountants § 19. This
Court will recognize such a standard, however, as a quintessential tort duty.
Despite scattered law to the contrary, the vast majority of jurisdictions treat this
standard for what it is - a duty of care imposed by law. Moreover, as already
shown, Utah case law treats the critical tort-based causation analysis the same
regardless how the plaintiff attempts to frame its case. Finally, Guardian itself
contradictorily disavows that it is advancing such a claim. Guardian argues that
Utah professional malpractice case law is "directly on point" and that Tebbs is
held to the standard of "skill, care, knowledge, and judgment" in the relevant
profession while simultaneously arguing that this is not a malpractice action.
Guardian's claim is undeniably one for malpractice, despite its label.
Notwithstanding Guardian's legal maneuverings, the Court should look past the
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form of the claim and examine its substance. In sum. the separate implied duties
alleged by Guardian serve only to confirm Tebbs* legal position in every respect.
The mischief inherent in indulging the plaintiffs creative pleading attempt
is apparent: Guardian seeks to circumvent the inevitable consequences of
established tort law. Under well-established negligence principles, the trier of
fact may compare the negligence of the plaintiff to any negligence of the
defendants and bar plaintiffs claim if the plaintiffs negligence exceeds that of
the defendants. Furthermore, under well-established agency law, a principal is
not liable for acts of its employees performed outside the scope of the
employment. These time-honored principles allow a court to adjust liability,
apportion damages, and shift losses based on notions of reasonableness and
fairness under all the circumstances. This is especially important when, as here,
a defendant in Tebbs' shoes has itself been victimized by a third party - Mitchell
- aided in large part by the plaintiffs own deliberate carelessness.
Guardian attempts an end run around these principles by. in effect, seeking
to impose strict liability on Tebbs. Guardian's view of its case is that only Tebbs
should bear the burden of the loss, despite overwhelming, significant contributory
negligence on Guardian's part. Guardian's approach is not and should not be the
law. "In determining whether a tort or contract claim has been pled, the court
must look to the substance of the allegations, not the labels attached to them.''
- 17-

Thomas w Goadreaulu 786 P.2d 1010, 1014-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). The trial
court recognized substance over form and analyze Guardian's "implied contract"
case for what it is; a claim sounding in tort that has not been pleaded or proved,
and that is barred by common law principles in any event.
The case law universally recognizes that using pre-signed blank checks
and/or a signature stamp (both of which Guardian used in this case) are negligent
acts. See, e.g. 2 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 19-3, at 240-45
(4th ed. 1995) (collecting numerous cases, and noting in UCC commentary that
"leaving a large blank space at a critical spot on a check would be failure to
exercise ordinary care substantially contributing to an alteration"). In this case.
Guardian's negligent acts are the primary cause of its loss. Guardian "opened the
door" to its loss by providing Mitchell with blank, pre-signed and pre-stamped
checks.
This substantially negligent act is even more egregious in this case because
Guardian is itself a fiduciary to third parties, closeK regulated by the State of
Utah and charged with handling escrow monies. Guardian knows the importance
of handling such matters with care. Notwithstanding this fact, Guardian used a
dangerous pre-signed check policy it was advised against with virtually no
oversight - for the sole sake of "convenience" - paving the way for that theft that
led to this lawsuit.
-18-

Guardian was negligent in failing to even cursorily inspect or pay attention
to its payroll matters. Guardian did not count the payroll checks, ask for a
reconciliation, compare amounts or persons paid with its employee payroll, look
a bank statements or checks, or take any other step to verily- a matter as important
as its internal payroll. Here, Guardian's failure to act reasonably caused the loss
it now seeks to shift to Tebbs. Had Guardian exercised ordinary care, it should
have and would have caught the "extra" checks. Cf. Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-4306, 406; Zion 's First Nat'I Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1097
(Utah 1988) (bank customer has duty to exercise reasonable promptness in
examining statement or checks for forgery, unauthorized signatures, or
alterations).
Utah courts recognize that comparative negligence principles apply in
actions against accountants. "For a client to be contributorily negligent, his
negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury caused by the
professional stemming from the professional relationship." Steiner Corp. v.
Johnson & Higgins, 996 P.2d 531, 532 (Utah 2000) (accountant malpractice).
"[W]hen the negligence of the plaintiff is 'causally connected' to the injury . . .
the damages awarded to the plaintiff [can] be reduced proportionately" and the
plaintiffs negligent acts "can be considered in determining causation and
damages." Id. at 534.
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In Utah, a plaintiff may only recover in a negligence action if the
defendants' fault exceeds its own. This is the analysis that Guardian attempted
to avoid as it framed it pleadings in this case. For the reasons set forth above, the
trial court, again, correctly concluded that Guardian's claims against Tebbs were
barred as a matter of law.
III. TEBBS is NOT LIABLE FOR THE ILLEGAL ACTS OF MITCHELL

The parties agree that the principals are bound by the acts of their agents
which fall within the scope of the authority of the agents. See Horrocks v.
West/alia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). However, an
employer is not liable for an employee's acts committed outside the scope of her
employment, and certain acts fall outside the scope as a matter of law. See. e.g.,
Jackson v. Rightei\ 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995). Illegal acts by an
employee, for the sole benefit and purpose of the employee and not the employer,
designed to further her own interests only, are not within the actual or apparent
scope of authority. The employer, therefore, cannot be liable for such illegal acts.
Such criminal acts are outside the scope of employment. See Los Ranchitos v.
Tierra Grande. Inc., 861 P.2d 263, 269 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (collection case).
This principle is a matter of agency law that applies in the contract as well
as the tort arena. Traditional agency rules apply to all areas of law, where the
particular facts so indicate, unless otherwise agreed. See, e.g., Restatement

(Second) of Agency, §§ 35-81 & sc. n. at 4 (1958) (agency principles generally
apply "unless otherwise agreed"). Guardian itself invokes such principles in
arguing that Tebbs is bound by Mitchell's actions (arguing that basic agency law
dictates that a principal is bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent
authority). Even if Guardian's claim were classified as a contract claim, the
alleged breach arises only if Mitchell's bad acts can properly be characterized as
binding on Tebbs and therefore only if she were acting within the scope of her
authority and in furtherance of her employment duties. See Id.; see also Id. at §§
228-237 (defining agency rules regarding scope of employment).
Here, Guardian has not even suggested that Mitchell's willful personal acts
were undertaken for anyone's benefit but her own. While Mitchell should clearly
be held liable, Tebbs should not be held responsible for Mitchell's criminal acts
- period. See, e.g. Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah
1979) ("[I]f the employee is not so authorized and is acting for his own interests,
and not in the furtherance of the employer's business, the latter would not be
bound by his act."); Birkner v. Salt Lake County; 111 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah
1989) (to be within the scope of employment, "an employee's conduct must be of
the general kind the employee is employed to perform," and "the employee's
conduct must be motivated, at least in. part, by the purpose of serving the
employer's interest"); Sweatman v. Linton, 241 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1925) ("[B]ut
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if the agent go beyond the range of his employment or duties, and of his own will
do an unlawful act injurious to another, the agent is liable, but he master or
employer is not."); Gottlieb v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 609 N.Y.S.2d 344, 344-45
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("We note, in any event, that the criminal acts committed
by the defendant's employees were outside the scope of their employment and in
no way advanced the interests of the defendant, so that the defendant could not
be held liable . . . ."). Some conduct, such as that at issue here, "is so clearly
outside the scope of employment that he issue may properly be decided by the
trial judge as a matter of law." Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057.
Were the Court to hold as Guardian desires, the law applied in
embezzlement cases would be forever altered. No plaintiff would ever again
allege anything but breach of "implied contract" terms, thereby avoiding pesky
roadblocks to recover}7, such as the plaintiffs own fault, proximate causation, and
firmly established agency principles. The Utah Supreme Court clearly signaled
just the opposite result should be obtained when, in a non-tort case, it applied
standards identical to those it had developed over many years in the tort field. See
KilpatricK 909 P.2d at 1291.
As a matter of law, Mitchell's criminal acts cannot impose liability on her
employer, Tebbs, and cannot form the basis for Guardian's claim against Tebbs.
This is true notwithstanding Guardian's creative pleading attempt.
- 9? .

For each of these reasons, the trial court correctly viewed Guardian's
implied contract claims as sounding in tort and barred the claims as a matter of
law.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that there were no disputed issues of
material fact and that Tebbs was entitled to a summary as a matter of law. This
Appellee respectfully requests that following its review of the trial court's grant
of summary7 judgment for correctness, even giving no particular deference to its
conclusions of law, that this Court find that the trial court did not err in applying
the governing law to the undisputed issues of material fact and that it affirm the
grant of summary judgment.
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